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Abstract
Modern network virtualization platforms enable users to specify custom topologies and arbitrary addressing
schemes for their virtual networks. These platforms have, however, been targeting the data center of a single
provider, which is insufficient to support (critical) applications that need to be deployed across multiple trust
domains, while enforcing diverse security requirements. This paper addresses this limitation by presenting
a novel solution for the central resource allocation problem of network virtualization – the virtual network
embedding, which aims to find efficient mappings of virtual network requests onto the substrate network.
We improve over the state-of-the-art by considering security as a first-class citizen of virtual networks, while
enhancing the substrate infrastructure with resources from multiple cloud providers. Our solution enables
the definition of flexible policies in three core elements: on the virtual links, where alternative security com-
promises can be explored (e.g., encryption); on the virtual switches, supporting various degrees of protection
and redundancy if necessary; and on the substrate infrastructure, extending it across multiple clouds, in-
cluding public and private facilities, with their inherently diverse trust levels associated. We propose an
optimal solution to this problem formulated as a Mixed Integer Linear Program (MILP). The results of our
evaluation give insight into the trade-offs associated with the inclusion of security demands into network
virtualization. In particular, they provide evidence that enhancing the user’s virtual networks with security
does not preclude high acceptance rates and an efficient use of resources, and allows providers to increase
their revenues.
Keywords: network virtualization; network embedding; security
1. Introduction
Network virtualization has emerged as a powerful technique to allow multiple heterogeneous virtual net-
works to run over a shared infrastructure. Production-level platforms recently proposed [1, 2] give users the
flexibility to run virtual networks with customized topologies and addressing schemes. These solutions not
only improve the operation of large enterprise infrastructures but also enable cloud operators to extend their
service offerings of virtual storage and compute with network virtualization [1].
These modern platforms have two limitations that motivate our work. First, they constrain the substrate
to the infrastructure controlled by a single cloud operator. This limits their scalability and dependability,
as a single provider is effectively a single point of failure. Several incidents in cloud facilities are evidence of
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this increasingly acute problem [3, 4] – a problem that is today an important barrier to service adoption as
more critical applications start shifting to the cloud. This limitation motivates the exploration of availability-
enhancing alternatives (e.g., through replication over multiple providers).
To overcome this problem, we have developed a platform that extends network virtualization to span
multiple cloud providers [5, 6]. Enriching the substrate this way results in a number of benefits in terms
of cost (e.g., by taking advantage of the pricing dynamics of cloud services [7]), performance (for instance,
by bringing services closer to their users), dependability, and security. As an example of the latter, a
tenant1 that needs to comply with privacy legislation may request different parts of its virtual network to
be placed in different locations. For instance, to abide by the recently implemented General Data Protection
Regulation (GPDR), a virtual switch connecting databases that contain user data may need to be placed
at a specific private location under the tenant’s control, while the rest of the network is offloaded to public
cloud infrastructures, to take advantage of their elasticity and flexibility. With a multi-cloud substrate,
an application can also be made immune to any single data center (or cloud availability zone) outage by
spreading its services across providers.
Existing solutions (e.g., VMware NSX [1]) offer their tenants traditional networking services. They
allow tenants to specify a virtual topology of L2 switches and L3 routers, to define arbitrary addresses
to their network elements, and to set ACL filtering rules. Although this represents a formidable advance
over the recent past (e.g., VLANs), it is still rather limited with respect to security and dependability.
Motivated by this limitation, we extend virtual networks with security assurances that go beyond simple
ACL configurations. Specifically, we allow users to specify security constraints for each element of the virtual
network. These constraints address, for instance, concerns about attacks on specific virtual hosts (e.g.,
covert channels or DDoS attacks) or on physical links (e.g., replay/eavesdropping). In our solution, a tenant
can define a high security level to particularly sensitive virtual nodes and/or links, mandating, respectively,
their instantiation in secure VMs (e.g., an Amazon EC2 instance that provides DDoS protection), and their
mapping to substrate paths that guarantee the required security properties (e.g., confidentiality). To further
extend the resiliency properties of our solution, and since we support the coexistence of resources from
multiple clouds, both public and private, we assume each individual infrastructure (cloud) to have distinct
levels of trust, from a user standpoint, enabling for instance virtual networks that are GPDR-compliant, as
per the example above.
In this paper, we tackle the central resource allocation that is required to materialize a network virtual-
ization solution – the Virtual Network Embedding (VNE) – from this new perspective. VNE addresses the
problem of embedding the virtual networks specified by the tenants into the substrate infrastructure. When
a virtual network request arrives, the goal is to find an efficient mapping of the virtual nodes and links onto
the substrate network, while maximizing the revenue of the virtualization provider. This objective is subject
to various constraints, such as the processing capacity on the substrate nodes and bandwidth of the links.
The literature on the problem is vast [8], but unfortunately, no existing solution meets all our requirements.
In particular, the approaches that consider security are either limited in the level of protection offered, include
assumptions that make them impractical for use in modern virtualization platforms, and/or do not fit an
enriched multi-cloud substrate. We further detail these differences in Section 7.
Motivated by this gap in the literature, in this paper we propose an optimal VNE solution, based on
Mixed Integer Linear Programming (MILP), that considers security constraints based on indications from
the tenants. These constraints address the concerns about attacks on hosts and on links mentioned above,
including supporting the coexistence of resources (nodes/links) in multiple clouds with distinct levels of trust.
1We employ the terms user and tenant interchangeably in the paper.
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Given the limited expressiveness of a MILP formulation, we also propose a policy language to specify user
requests. Our language includes conjunction (‘and’ ), disjunction (‘or’ ), and negation (‘not’ ) operations,
enabling tenants to express alternative resource requirements.
We have evaluated our proposal against the most commonly used VNE alternative [9]. The results show
that our solution makes a more efficient use of network resources, which is translated into higher acceptance
ratios and reduced costs. This demonstrates the advantage of our model for this context. Another interesting
takeaway is that the performance decrease is limited even when a reasonable number of virtual network
requests includes security requirements. For instance, when 20% of requests include security demands, the
reduction in acceptance ratio is of only 1 percentage point. The results also illustrate the cost/revenue trade-
off of including security services, shedding some light on the pricing schemes a virtualization operator should
employ to benefit from offering these value-added services.
The contributions of our work can thus be summarized as: (i) We formulate the SecVNE model and solve
it as a Mixed Integer Linear Program (MILP). The novelty of our approach is in considering comprehensive
security aspects over a multi-cloud deployment; (ii) We propose a new policy language to specify the char-
acteristics of the substrate network, and to allow the expression of user requirements; (iii) We evaluate our
formulation against the most commonly used VNE alternative [9], and analyze its various trade-offs with
respect to embedding efficiency, costs and revenues.
2. Multi-Cloud Network Virtualization
Our multi-cloud network virtualization platform, Sirius, leverages from Software Defined Networking
(SDN) to build a substrate infrastructure that spreads across both public clouds and private data centers [5].
These resources are then transparently shared by various tenants, allowing the definition and deployment of
virtual networks (VN) composed of a number of virtual hosts (containers in our implementation) intercon-
nected by virtual switches, arranged in an arbitrary network topology. While specifying the virtual network,
it is possible to indicate several requirements for the switches and links, for example with respect to the needed
bandwidth, CPU capacity, and security guarantees. These requirements are enforced during embedding by
laying out the VN elements at the appropriate locations. Specifically, those where the substrate infrastruc-
ture still has enough resources that fulfill the security requirements to satisfy the particular demands. In
addition, the datapaths are configured by the SDN controller by installing the necessary forwarding rules in
the switches.
For example, as illustrated in Figure 1, virtual machines (VM) might be acquired by the virtualization
operator at specific cloud providers to run tenants’ containers implementing their distributed services. In
this scenario, the most relevant security aspects that may need to be assessed are the following. First, the
trust level associated with a cloud provider is influenced by various factors, which may have to be taken
into consideration when running critical applications. Providers are normally better regarded if they show a
good past track record on breaches and failures, have been on the market for a while, and advertise Service
Level Agreements (SLAs) with stronger assurances for the users. Moreover, as the virtualization operator
has full control over its own data centers, it might employ protection features and procedures to make them
compliant with regulations that have to be fulfilled by tenants (e.g., the EU GDPR that has recently come
into force).
Second, VMs can be configured with a mix of defense mechanisms, e.g., firewalls and antivirus, to build
execution environments with stronger degrees of security at a premium price. These mechanisms can be
selected by the operator when setting up the VMs, eventually based on the particular requirements of a
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Figure 1: Example substrate network encompassing resources from multiple clouds.
group of tenants, or they could be sold ready to use by the cloud providers (e.g., like in Amazon2 or Azure3
offerings). Highly protected VMs arguably give more trustworthy conditions for the execution of the switch
employed by the container manager, ensuring correct packet forwarding among the containers and the external
network (e.g., without being eavesdropped or tampered with by malicious co-located containers).
Third, the switches can also be configured with various defenses to protect network traffic. In particular,
it is possible to setup tunnels between switches implementing alternative security measures. For instance, if
confidentiality is not a concern, then it is possible to add message authentication codes (MAC) to packets to
afford integrity but without paying the full performance cost of encryption. Further countermeasures could
also be added, such as denial of service detection and deep packet inspection to selected flows. In some cases,
if the trusted hardware is accessible (such as Intel CPUs with SGX extensions in the private cloud), one could
leverage from it to enforce greater isolation while performing the cryptographic operations – for example, to
guarantee that secret keys are never exposed.
The reader should notice that the above discussion would also apply to other deployment scenarios.
For example, the virtualization operator could offer VNs of virtual machines (instead of containers) in dis-
tinct cloud providers. This would require the use of nested virtualization mechanisms (e.g., [10]), and in
this case, the relevant network appliances would be the nested hypervisor switches and their corresponding
inter-connections. We have instead opted for using lightweight virtualization mechanisms, aligned with the
increasing trend towards the use of microservices and other forms of serverless computing [11].
2For example: Trend Micro Deep Security at aws.amazon.com/marketplace.
3For example: Check Point vSEC at azuremarketplace.microsoft.com.
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Substrate Network Modeling. Given the envisioned scenarios, the substrate network is modeled as a
weighted undirected graph GS = (NS , ES , ASN , A
S
E), composed of a set of nodes N
S (e.g., switches/routers)
and edges ES interconnecting them. Both the nodes and the edges have attributes that reflect their particular
characteristics. The collection of attributes we specify in our model resulted from conversations with several
companies from the healthcare and energy sectors that are moving their critical services to the cloud, and they
represent a balance among three goals: they should be (i) expressive enough to represent the main security
requirements when deploying virtual networks; (ii) easy to specify when configuring a network, requiring a
limited number of options; and (iii) be readily implementable with available technologies.
The following attributes are considered for substrate nodes:
ASN = {{cpuS(n), secS(n), cloudS(n)} | n ∈ NS}
The total amount of CPU that can be allocated for the switching operations of node n is given by
cpuS(n) > 0. Depending on the underlying machine capacity and the division of CPU cycles among the
various tasks (e.g., tenant jobs, storage, network), cpuS(n) can take a greater or smaller value. The security
level associated to the node is secS(n) > 0. Nodes that run in an environment that implements stronger
protections will have a greater value for secS(n). The trustworthiness degree associated with a cloud provider
is indicated with cloudS(n) > 0.
The substrate edges have the following attributes:
ASE = {{bwS(l), secS(l)} | l ∈ ES}
The first attribute, bwS(l) > 0, corresponds to the total amount of bandwidth capacity of the substrate
link l. The security measures enforced by the link are reflected in secS(l) > 0. If the link implements tunnels
that ensure integrity and confidentiality (by resorting to MACs and encryption) then it will have a higher
secS(l) than a default edge that simply forwards packets.
Virtual Network Modeling. VNs have an arbitrary topology and are composed of a number of nodes and
the edges that interconnect them. When a tenant wants to instantiate a VN, besides indicating the nodes’
required processing capacity and bandwidth for the links, she/he may also include as requirements security
demands. These demands are defined by specifying security attribute values associated with the resources.
In terms of modeling, a VN is also modeled as a weighted undirected graph, GV = (NV , EV , AVN , A
V
E),
composed of a set of nodes NV and edges (or links) EV . Both the nodes and the edges have attributes that
portray characteristics that need to be fulfilled when embedding is performed. Both AVN and A
V
E mimic the
attributes presented for the substrate network. The only exception is an additional attribute that allows for
the specification of security requirements related to availability.
This attribute, availV (n), indicates that a particular node should have a backup replica to be used as a
cold spare. This causes the embedding procedure to allocate an additional node and the necessary links to
interconnect it to its neighboring nodes. These resources will only be used in case the virtualization platform
detects a failure in the primary (or working) node. availV (n) defines where the backup of virtual node n
should be mapped. If no backup is necessary, availV (n) = 0. If virtual node n requires a backup to be
placed in the same cloud, then availV (n) = 1. Otherwise, if n should have a backup in another cloud (e.g.,
to survive cloud outages), then availV (n) = 2.
3. Secure Virtual Network Embedding Problem
Our approach to VNE enables the specification of VNs to be mapped over a multi-cloud substrate,
enhancing the security and flexibility of network virtualization. More precisely, we define the Secure Virtual
Network Embedding (SecVNE) problem as follows:
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Figure 2: Example of the embedding of a virtual network request (top) onto a multi-cloud substrate network (bot-
tom). The figure also illustrates the various constraints and the resulting mapping after the execution of our MILP
formulation.
SecVNE problem: Given a virtual network request (VNR) with resources and security demands GV , and
a substrate network GS with the resources to serve incoming VNRs, can GV be mapped to GS ensuring an
efficient use of resources while satisfying the following constraints? (i) Each virtual edge is mapped to the
substrate network meeting the bandwidth and security constraints; (ii) Each virtual node is mapped to the
substrate network meeting the CPU capacity and security constraints (including node availability and cloud
trust domain requirements).
Our approach handles the SecVNE problem, mapping a VN onto the substrate network respecting all
constraints. When a VNR arrives, the goal of the embedding solution is to minimize the cost of mapping,
while fulfilling all requirements. In the situations when there are not enough substrate resources available,
the incoming request is rejected. To minimize these events, and therefore increase the VN acceptance ratio,
we may allocate resources that are of a higher level of security than the ones specified in the VNR. We
find this option to represent a good trade-off. For typical workloads, the alternative of having a more strict
mapping will reduce the acceptance ratio while causing resources to be underutilized.
Figure 2 shows an example of embedding a VNR (displayed on top) onto the substrate of Figure 1
(represented at the bottom). We assume a maximum security level of 5 for virtual nodes, and of 3 for virtual
links. We also assume in this example a cloud trustworthiness of 1 for the public cloud, of 2 for the trusted
public cloud, and of 3 for the trusted private cloud. These values were chosen arbitrarily for the sake of this
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Figure 3: Network model when no backup is requested (left); and when at least one backup node is requested (right).
example – the operator will set these parameters to fit the specificities of its substrate. The VNR consists of
two nodes interconnected by one virtual link. Node a requires 10 units of CPU (cpuV (a) = 10), a medium
level of security (secV (a) = 3), and a default cloud trust level (cloudV (a) = 1). Besides slightly different
CPU and security demands, the user requires the second node to be replicated. Further, the primary and
backup nodes should be placed in different clouds (availV (b) = 2). For the virtual link the user requires 20
units of bandwidth (bwV (a, b) = 20), and a medium level of security (secV (a, b) = 2).
The resulting embedding guarantees that all requirements are satisfied. Specifically, node a is mapped
onto a substrate node with a security level equal to the one requested, on a public cloud (secS(B) = 3 and
cloudS(B) = 1). The other virtual node and its backup are embedded on different clouds that fulfill the
trustworthiness request (respectively, cloudS(C) = 2 and cloudS(E) = 3). It is also possible to observe that
one of the substrate paths (namely, the primary/working) maps to two substrate edges ((B,D) and (D,C)),
but guaranteeing that they both have the necessary security level (2, in this case). In addition, the primary
and backup paths are disjoint. As will be justified later, this is a requirement of our solution. The figure
also displays meta-links connecting the virtual nodes to the substrate nodes they are mapped onto (e.g., the
dash-dotted line between a and B). This is an important artifact in our modeling that is going to be explored
in the MILP formulation (Section 5).
Before closing this section, we detail how we model differently the VNRs that include backup requests,
from those that do not have such requirements. Please refer to Figure 3. For VNRs where no node requests
a backup, we only model the working network (Figure 3, left). However, when at least one node requires
backup, we model two networks (Figure 3, right): the working network, mapping all nodes and all primary
paths; and the backup network. The backup network also includes all nodes. However, nodes that require
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backup are mapped to a different substrate node from that of the working node, whereas nodes that do not
require backup will be placed in the same substrate node. As this is an artifact of the model, no resources
are reserved to this latter node. The backup network includes only the backup paths that interconnect the
backups to their neighbors. As such, nodes that do not require backup and are not backup neighbors do not
need to be connected to the rest of the network (one example is node d in the figure).
4. A Policy Language to Specify SecVNE
We support two alternative ways for both the virtualization operator and for the tenant to describe the
substrate network and the virtual network, respectively. The first is based on a graphical interface where the
users can draw their arbitrary topologies, including nodes, links, and the associated attributes. In this case,
after the tenants draw their virtual network and launch a VNR, the solution runs the embedding solution we
present in this paper (Section 5) to map the request into the substrate.
As a result of our conversations with potential users of our platform (namely, enterprises that run critical
applications), we have come to realize that a common requirement was that of expressing different options.
A typical example was that of a virtual node for which a high level of security is required if placed in a less
trusted infrastructure (e.g., a public cloud), but that could have its security requirement lightened if placed
in a highly trusted infrastructure (e.g., a private cloud). Indeed, a problem with this first approach is that it
does not grant tenants with this level of expressiveness.
We thus introduce a second approach based on a policy language, that lets the user describe both the
substrate and the VNRs in a programmatic fashion. The production rules of the grammar were kept relatively
simple, but the achieved level of expressiveness is much greater than what is attained with the graphical
interface alone. As the characteristics of the substrate and VNRs are distinct, we explain them separately in
the following.
Substrate Specification
S → funcS(parameter) = valuenum
S → S & S
Virtual Network Specification
V → funcV (parameter) = valuenum
V → funcV (parameter) ≥ valuenum
V → !V ; (V ); V & V ; V | V
Table 1: Policy grammar to define SecVNE parameters.
The substrate part of the SecVNE policy grammar (top rows of Table 1) enables the listing of resources
that compose the substrate. The parameters represent the substrate node or link ID, and the function enables
the specification of particular attributes. For example, the leftmost cloud of Figure 2 is specified as:
substrate→ cpuS(A) = 80 & secS(A) = 1 & cloudS(A) = 1 &
cpuS(B) = 80 & secS(B) = 3 & cloudS(B) = 1 &
bwS(A,B) = 100 & secS(A,B) = 2 & ...
In the virtual part of the SecVNE policy grammar (bottom rows of Table 1), the relations dictate the
requirements for each node and link of the VNR. Differently from the substrate part, certain functions specify
exact values, whereas others specify a minimum demand. For instance, while the CPU requirement is an
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Symbol Meaning
wf i,jp,q > 0 The amount of working flow, i.e., bandwidth, on physical link (p,q) for virtual link (i,j )
bf i,jp,q > 0 The amount of backup flow, i.e., backup bandwidth, on physical link (p,q) for virtual link (i,j )
wli,jp,q ∈ {0, 1} Denotes whether virtual link (i,j ) is mapped onto physical link (p,q). (1 if (i,j ) is mapped on (p,q), 0otherwise)
bli,jp,q ∈ {0, 1} Denotes whether the backup of virtual link (i,j ) is mapped onto physical link (p,q). (1 if backup of (i,j )is mapped on (p,q), 0 otherwise)
wni,p ∈ {0, 1} Denotes whether virtual node i is mapped onto physical node p. (1 if i is mapped on p, 0 otherwise)
bni,p ∈ {0, 1} Denotes whether virtual node i ’s backup is mapped onto physical node p. (1 if i ’s backup is mapped onp, 0 otherwise)
wci,c ∈ {0, 1} Denotes whether virtual node i is mapped on cloud c. (1 if i is mapped on c, 0 otherwise)
bci,c ∈ {0, 1} Denotes whether virtual node i ’s backup is mapped on cloud c. (1 if i ’s backup is mapped on c, 0otherwise)
Table 2: Domain constraints (decision variables) used in the MILP formulation.
exact value, the security function specifies the minimum security level required, as a virtual node can be
mapped to a substrate node with either the same or a higher security level. As the grammar supports
boolean operations, including or (“|”), and (“&”), and not (“!”), it is possible to express alternative resource
requirements.
As an example, consider the following VN with two nodes and one edge:
V N → (CPUV (a) = 10 & secV (a) > 3 & cloudV (a) > 1 &
availV (a) = 0) & (CPUV (b) = 20 & availV (b) = 1 &
((secV (b) > 1 & cloudV (b) > 4) | (secV (b) > 4 & cloudV (b) > 1)) &
(bwV (a, b) = 20 & secV (a, b) > 2)
Node a requires a security level of at least 3, and cloud trustworthiness of 1 or higher. For node b, on
the other hand, the tenant makes a compromise between node security and the degree of cloud trust. If the
cloud has a high level of trust (at least 4), then this node’s security level can be as low as 1. However, the
tenant is willing to have this virtual node mapped in a less trusted cloud (with a trust level of only 1), but
in that case, the node security level is increased to at least 4.
When processing a VNR containing a VN with several optional demands as this one, we generate all
possible requests that would satisfy the tenant. Then, we evaluate each one and select the solution with the
lowest cost. There are two main benefits to this approach. First, as explained, the increased expressiveness
allows tenants to explore different trade-offs with respect to security and availability of their resources.
Second, by evaluating several solutions we increase the number of options, reducing mapping costs and, as a
consequence, enabling higher acceptance ratios.
5. MILP Formulation
In this section we present our MILP formulation to solve the SecVNE problem. The section starts by
explaining the decision variables used in the formulation, proceeds to present the objective function, and
finally the constraints required to model the problem.
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Symbol Meaning
β1, β2, β3
Coefficients used in the Objective Function to provide a weighted-sum properly parameterized for each
objective.
αp,q A weight representing the relative cost of link (p,q).
nodeLocationp,c Denotes the location of substrate node p. (1 if substrate node p is located in cloud c; 0 otherwise)
backupNetwork Assumes value 1 if at least one of the nodes of a VNR requests backup; 0 otherwise.
workingp,q Auxiliary binary variable defining if a physical link (p, q) is part of the working network.
backupp,q Auxiliary binary variable defining if a physical link (p, q) is part of the backup network.
Table 3: Additional parameters used in the MILP formulation.
5.1. Decision variables and auxiliary parameters
Table 2 presents the variables that are used in our MILP formulation. Briefly, wf i,jp,q, bf
i,j
p,q, wl
i,j
p,q and bl
i,j
p,q
are related to (working and backup) links; wni,p and bni,p are associated with (working and backup) nodes;
and wci,c and bci,c are related to the cloud location of a virtual node. In Table 3 we present a few additional
parameters used on the formulation. Their importance will be made clear as we describe the solution.
N˚V = { i ∈ NV : availV (i) = 0 }
N
V
= NV \ N˚V
E˚V = { (i, j) ∈ EV : availV (i) = 0 and availV (j) = 0 }
E
V
= EV \ E˚V
Table 4: Auxiliary sets to facilitate the description of the formulation constraints.
The formulation also employs a few auxiliary sets whose value depends on the VNR, as shown in Table 4.
For example, N˚V is a set that includes all nodes that do not require backup, and N
V
is its complement. As
such, when N
V
= ∅ that means no virtual node requires backup. We recall that, when this happens, we only
model a working network. This means that every backup-related decision variable (bf i,jp,q, bl
i,j
p,q, bni,p, bci,c)
is equal to 0. On the other hand, if N
V 6= ∅, then we model both a working and a backup network (recall
Figure 3). When we need to model a backup network (i.e., when at least one node requests backup), then we
introduce another artifact into our model. Namely, if virtual node i has availV (i) = 0, indicating that it does
not require replication, then both the working and the backup nodes of i are placed in the same substrate
node p (i.e., wni,p = bni,p = 1). However, it is guaranteed that this second node, the “virtual” (i.e., not
requested) backup, does not consume resources (e.g., CPU). When a virtual node j has availV (j) > 0, thus
requiring replication, it is necessary to map the working and backup in different substrate nodes (possibly in
distinct clouds, as explained in Section 2). In this case, the backup will have the necessary resources reserved,
to be able to substitute the primary in case of failure.
5.2. Objective Function
The objective function aims to minimize three aspects (see Eq. 1): 1) the sum of all computing costs, 2)
the sum of all communication costs, and 3) the overall number of hops of the substrate paths used to map
the virtual links. Since these objectives are measured in different units, we resort to a composite function,
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which can be parametrized and used to compute different solutions (others approaches could be used, see
Steuer [12]). Thus, the formulation is based on a weighted-sum function with three different coefficients, β1,
β2, and β3, which should be reasonably parameterized by the virtualization operator for each objective.
min β1
[ ∑
i∈NV
∑
p∈NS
cpuV (i) secS(p) cloudS(p) wni,p
+
∑
i∈NV
∑
p∈NS
cpuV (i) secS(p) cloudS(p) bni,p
]
+ β2
[ ∑
(i,j)∈EV
∑
(p,q)∈ES
αp,q sec
S(p, q) wf i,jp,q
+
∑
(i,j)∈EV
∑
(p,q)∈ES
αp,q sec
S(p, q) bf i,jp,q
]
+ β3
[ ∑
(i,j)∈EV
∑
(p,q)∈ES
wli,jp,q +
∑
(i,j)∈EV
∑
(p,q)∈ES
bli,jp,q
]
(1)
The first part of Eq. 1 covers the computing costs, including both the working and backup nodes (top 2
lines). The second part of the equation is the sum of all working and backup link bandwidth costs (lines 3-4).
The last part of the objective function is related to the number of hops of the working and backup paths.
A few aspects are worth detailing. First, note that for the node backup case we restrict the sum to the
set of nodes that require backup (N
V
). This is needed to express that the nodes that do not require backup
(the “virtual” backups referred above) do not consume resources. The equation considers the level of security
of the substrate resources and the trustworthiness of the cloud infrastructure that hosts them. This is based
on the assumption that a higher level of security or of trustworthiness is translated into an increased cost.
As the parameters that formalize these levels (secS(p) and cloudS(p)) can take as value any positive real
number, this allows the virtualization operator to fine-tune its costs. To address the possibility that different
substrate edges may have different costs, we have included a multiplicative parameter αp,q in lines 3-4. This
parameter is a weight that can be used to express these differences. For instance, a link connecting two
clouds might have a higher (monetary, delay, or other) cost, when compared to intra-cloud links.
Intuitively, this objective function attempts to economize the most “powerful” resources (e.g., those with
higher security levels) for VNRs that explicitly require them. Therefore, for instance, it is expected in most
cases virtual nodes with secV = 1 to be mapped onto substrate nodes with secS = 2 only if there are no
other substrate nodes with secS = 1 available.
5.3. Security Constraints
Next, we enumerate the constraints related to the security of (working and backup) nodes, edges, and
clouds, respectively:
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wni,p sec
V (i) 6 secS(p), ∀i ∈ NV , p ∈ NS (2)
bni,p sec
V (i) 6 secS(p), ∀i ∈ NV , p ∈ NS (3)
wli,jp,q sec
V (i, j) 6 secS(p, q), ∀(i, j) ∈ EV , (p, q) ∈ ES (4)
bli,jp,q sec
V (i, j) 6 secS(p, q), ∀(i, j) ∈ EV , (p, q) ∈ ES (5)
wni,p cloud
V (i) 6 cloudS(p), ∀i ∈ NV , p ∈ NS (6)
bni,p cloud
V (i) 6 cloudS(p), ∀i ∈ NV , p ∈ NS (7)
The first of these constraints guarantees that a virtual node is only mapped to a substrate node that
has a security level that is equal to or greater than its demand (Eq. 2). The next equation guarantees the
same for backup nodes. The following two equations force each virtual edge to be mapped to (one or more)
physical links that provide a level of security that is at least as high as the one requested. This is guaranteed
for links connecting the primary nodes (Eq. 4) and the backups (Eq. 5). The last constraints ensure that a
virtual node i is mapped to a substrate node p only if the cloud where p is hosted has a trust level that is
equal or greater than the one demanded by i (Eq. 6 and 7 for working and backup, respectively).
5.4. Mapping Constraints
We take security, including availability, as a first class citizen in our solution. Therefore, when faced with a
choice between security and resource efficiency, we give preference to the former, as will be made clear next.
Node Embedding: We force each virtual node to be mapped to exactly one working substrate node (Eq. 8)
and, when a backup is requested, to a single backup substrate node (Eq. 9). We also guarantee that a
substrate node maps at most one virtual node (working or backup) of a single tenant. This means we have
opted to avoid substrate sharing in a tenant’s virtual network, to improve its availability. As a result, if one
substrate node fails, this will affect at most one (backup or working) virtual node. This is one example of our
design choice of availability over efficiency. This is expressed in three equations – Eq. 10 to 12 – due to the
use of the “virtual” backup artifact in our model. Eq. 10 guarantees that one substrate node maps at most
one working virtual node. The next equation guarantees the same for the backup case. Eq. 12 guarantees
that one substrate node will not map both a backup node and a virtual node. Note the use of the set N
V
to guarantee that the “virtual” backups are not included – they are the exception to the rule. As explained
in Section 5.1, if a virtual node requires no replication but there is a backup network (as at least one other
node has requested it), its working and backup are mapped onto the same substrate node. This is formalized
with the next two equations. Note they both use the set N˚V , meaning that they deal only with virtual nodes
that do not require backup. Eq. 13 guarantees that “virtual” backup nodes can only be mapped to their
corresponding working node, while Eq. 14 grants these substrate nodes the exception of hosting a maximum
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of 2 virtual nodes: the working and the “virtual” backup node.∑
p∈NS
wni,p = 1, ∀i ∈ NV (8)
∑
p∈NS
bni,p = 1, ∀i ∈ NV (9)∑
i∈NV
wni,p 6 1, ∀p ∈ NS (10)∑
i∈NV
bni,p 6 1, ∀p ∈ NS (11)∑
i∈NV
wni,p + bnj,p 6 1, ∀j ∈ NV , p ∈ NS (12)
bni,p 6 wni,p, ∀i ∈ N˚V , p ∈ NS (13)∑
i∈NV
wni,p + bnj,p 6 2, ∀j ∈ N˚V , p ∈ NS (14)
The next set of constraints create the necessary relationships between nodes and the flows that traverse
them.
wli,jp,q bw
V (i, j) > wf i,jp,q, ∀(i, j) ∈ EV , (p, q) ∈ ES (15)
bli,jp,q bw
V (i, j) > bf i,jp,q, ∀(i, j) ∈ EV , (p, q) ∈ ES (16)
wli,jp,q = wl
i,j
q,p, ∀(i, j) ∈ EV , p, q ∈ NS ∪NV (17)
bli,jp,q = bl
i,j
q,p, ∀(i, j) ∈ EV , p, q ∈ NS ∪NV (18)
Eq. 15 ensures that if there is a flow between nodes p and q for a virtual edge (i, j), then (i, j) is mapped
to the substrate link whose end-points are p and q. The use of the inequality in this equation is important,
to guarantee the possibility of network flows to use multiple paths. The next equation achieves the same
goal, but for the backup. We also include two binary constraints to force the symmetric property for the
binary variables that define the link mappings (Eqs. 17 and 18). Note that in these equations we included
links from both the substrate and the virtual networks. This is due to the need to include the meta-links
described in Section 3.
Similarly, we also need to establish the relation between the virtual nodes and the clouds they are embed-
ded into. This is achieved with Eqs. 19 and 20, for working and backups, respectively. Specifically, if virtual
node i is mapped onto a substrate node p, and p is hosted in cloud c, then i is mapped into cloud c. The
auxiliary parameter nodeLocationp,c has value 1 if substrate node p is hosted in cloud c, and 0 otherwise.
We also require each virtual node to be mapped to exactly one cloud (working or backup), with Eqs. 21 and
22. The auxiliary parameter backupNetwork assumes value 1 if a backup is needed for at least one of the
nodes of a VNR, or value 0 otherwise.
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∑
p∈NS
(wni,p nodeLocationp,c) > wci,c, ∀i ∈ NV , c ∈ C (19)∑
p∈NS
(bni,p nodeLocationp,c) > bci,c, ∀i ∈ NV , c ∈ C (20)∑
c∈C
wci,c = 1, ∀i ∈ NV (21)∑
c∈C
bci,c = backupNetwork, ∀i ∈ NV (22)
We give tenants three replication options for their virtual nodes: no replication, replication in the same
cloud, and replication in a different cloud. We must thus restrict the placement of the working and backup
nodes to the same or to distinct clouds, depending on the value of the availability attribute (availV (i)). This
is achieved with Eq. 234. In this equation, when availV (i) = 1, variable bci,c is equal to wci,c: the backup
is mapped to the same cloud as the working node, as required. By contrast, when availV (i) = 2, bci,c has to
be different from wci,c, so the nodes will be mapped to different clouds. Finally, when avail
V (i) = 0, bci,c
will be equal to zero (this condition needs to be considered jointly with Eq. 21).
|wci,c backupNetwork − bci,c| = (availV (i)− 1) ×
(wci,c backupNetwork + bci,c), ∀i ∈ NV , c ∈ C (23)
Link Embedding: The next constraints are related to the mapping of virtual links into the substrate. They
take advantage of the meta link artifact (recall Figure 2), which connects a virtual node i to the substrate
node p where it is mapped, to enforce a few restrictions.
wni,p bw
V (i, j) = wf i,ji,p , ∀ (i, j) ∈ EV , p ∈ NS (24)
wnj,q bw
V (i, j) = wf i,jq,j , ∀(i, j) ∈ EV , q ∈ NS (25)
bni,p bw
V (i, j) = bf i,ji,p backupNetwork, ∀(i, j) ∈ EV , p ∈ NS (26)
bnj,q bw
V (i, j) = bf i,jq,j backupNetwork, ∀(i, j) ∈ EV , q ∈ NS (27)∑
j,k!=i j,k∈NV
wf j,ki,p + wf
j,k
p,i = 0, ∀i ∈ NV , p ∈ NS (28)∑
j,k!=i j,k∈NV
bf j,ki,p + bf
j,k
p,i = 0, ∀i ∈ NV , p ∈ NS (29)
These constraints guarantee that the working flow of a virtual link (i, j) has its source in i and its sink
in j, traversing the corresponding substrate nodes (p and q) (Eq. 24 and 25). These equations effectively
define the meta-link artifact. The next two equations formalize the same requirement for the backup nodes.
Please note that even though the backup path is only used if the working substrate path fails, we reserve the
necessary resources during embedding to make sure they are available when needed. Eqs. 28 and 29 force
4Note that in the implementation the modulus function was linearized.
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meta-links to carry only (working or backup, respectively) traffic to/from their virtual nodes.
The next equations specify flow conservation restrictions at the nodes.
∑
p∈NS
wf i,ji,p −
∑
p∈NS
wf i,jp,i = bw
V (i, j), ∀(i, j) ∈ EV (30)
∑
p∈NS
wf i,jj,p −
∑
p∈NS
wf i,jp,j = −bwV (i, j), ∀(i, j) ∈ EV (31)∑
p∈NS∪NV
wf i,jq,p −
∑
p∈NS∪NV
wf i,jp,q = 0, ∀(i, j) ∈ EV , q ∈ NS (32)∑
p∈NS
bf i,ji,p −
∑
p∈NS
bf i,jp,i = bw
V (i, j) backupNetwork, ∀(i, j) ∈ EV (33)
∑
q∈NS
bf i,jj,q −
∑
q∈NS
bf i,jq,j = −bwV (i, j) backupNetwork, ∀(i, j) ∈ EV (34)∑
p∈NS∪NV
bf i,jq,p −
∑
p∈NS∪NV
bf i,jp,q = 0, ∀(i, j) ∈ EV , q ∈ NS (35)
Eqs. 30, 31 and 32 refer to the working flow conservation conditions, which denote that the network flow
to a node is zero, except for the source and the sink nodes, respectively. In an analogous way, the following
three equations refer to the backup flow conservation conditions (Eq. 33, 34 and 35).
The next set of constraints guarantee flow symmetry, to ensure the same flow traverses both directions,
for both working (Eq. 36) and backup nodes (Eq. 37). Finally, Eqs. 38 and 39 define the same flow for the
working node and its backup, for both directions.
wf i,jp,q = wf
j,i
q,p, ∀(i, j) ∈ EV , p, q ∈ NS ∪NV (36)
bf i,jp,q = bf
j,i
q,p, ∀(i, j) ∈ EV , p, q ∈ NS ∪NV (37)
wf i,jp,q = bf
i,j
p,q, ∀(i, j) ∈ E˚V , p, q ∈ NS (38)
wf j,ip,q = bf
j,i
p,q, ∀(i, j) ∈ E˚V , p, q ∈ NS (39)
Nodes and Links Disjointness: When a virtual node stops responding, it may have been the case that the
node has effectively faulted, or the failure has occurred in one of the substrate links that guarantees its
connectivity to other nodes. Aligned with our goal of providing high guarantees of availability, we aim to
cover these two cases. For this purpose, we ensure that the paths connecting the virtual nodes’ backup are
disjoint from the substrate resources used for the working part (otherwise, a single failure could compromise
both paths). For this purpose, we introduce the auxiliary binary variables workingp,q and backupp,q, that
define if a physical link (p, q) belongs to the working or to the backup networks, respectively.
workingp,q 6 1− backupp,q, ∀(p, q) ∈ ES (40)
wli,jp,q 6 workingp,q, ∀(i, j) ∈ EV , (p, q) ∈ ES (41)
bli,jp,q 6 backupp,q, ∀(i, j) ∈ E
V
, (p, q) ∈ ES (42)
First, we require disjointness between the working and backup paths (Eq. 40). Second, we guarantee
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that, if the working path of a virtual edge (i, j) is mapped onto a substrate link (p, q), then (p, q) is placed
into the working network (Eq. 41). Finally, we define the equivalent constraint to the backup part (Eq. 42).
5.5. Capacity Constraints
Node Capacity Constraints: Virtual nodes from different tenants, mapped as a response to a different VNR,
can be mapped to the same substrate node (in contrast to a node from the same tenant). Let’s call NV the
set of all virtual nodes that, at a certain moment, are mapped onto the substrate, and i ↑ p to indicate that
virtual node i is hosted on the substrate node p. Then, the residual capacity of a substrate node, RN (p), is
defined as the CPU capacity currently available in substrate node p ∈ NS .
RN (p) = cpu
S(p)−
∑
∀i↑p
cpuV (i), i ∈ NV
For a substrate node, we need to ensure that we never allocate more than its residual capacity, when
carrying out a new embedding. This needs to take into consideration the resources consumed by both the
working and backup nodes (Eq. 43).
∑
i∈NV
wni,p cpu
V (i) +
∑
j∈NV
bnj,p cpu
V (j) 6 RN (p), ∀p ∈ NS (43)
Link Capacity Constraints: Similarly, substrate links can also map virtual edges from different tenants. Lets
define EV as the set of all virtual edges mapped, at a certain instant, onto the substrate, and (i, j) ↑ (p, q) to
denote that the flow of virtual link (i, j) traverses substrate link (p, q). The residual capacity of a substrate
link, RE(p, q), is defined as the total amount of bandwidth available on the substrate link (p, q) ∈ ES .
RE(p, q) = bw
S(p, q)−
∑
∀(i,j)↑(p,q)
bwV (i, j), (i, j) ∈ EV
The following constraint ensures that the allocated capacity of a substrate link never exceeds the capacity
of that physical link, taking into consideration both the working and backup parts.
∑
(i,j)∈EV
wf i,jp,q +
∑
(i,j)∈EV
bf i,jp,q 6 RE(p, q), ∀(p, q) ∈ ES (44)
6. Evaluation
In this section we present performance results of our solution, considering diverse (virtual and substrate)
network topologies, and diverse VNR settings. Our evaluation aims to ask three main questions. First, what
is the performance of our solution when compared with the most common alternatives? Second, how does the
richer set of services offered by our solution (namely, security and availability) affect performance? Third,
can a multi-cloud virtualization provider benefit from offering these value-added services to its users?
6.1. Experimental Setup
The setting of our experiments follows the related literature on this problem. Specifically, we have
extended the simulator presented in [13] to simulate the dynamic arrival of Virtual Network Requests (VNRs)
to the system. To create the substrate networks we resorted to the network topology generator GT-ITM [14].
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Notation Algorithm description
NS+NA SecVNE with no security or availability requirements for VNs
10S+NA
SecVNE with VNRs having 10% of their resources (nodes and links) with security requirements (excluding
availability)
20S+NA Similar to 10S+NA, but with security requirements (excluding availability) for 20% of the resources
NS+10A SecVNE with no security requirements, but with 10% of the nodes requesting replication for increased availability
NS+20A Similar to 10S+NA, but with availability requirements for 20% of the resources
20S+20A SecVNE with 20% of the resources (nodes and links) with requirements for security and 20% for replication
D-ViNE VNE MILP solution presented in [9]
Table 5: VNR configurations evaluated in the experiments.
Two kinds of networks were evaluated: one based on random topologies, where every pair of nodes is randomly
connected with a probability between 25% and 30%; and the other employing the Waxman model to link the
nodes with a probability of 50% [15].
The substrate networks have a total of 25 nodes. The CPU and bandwidth (cpuS and bwS) of nodes
and links is uniformly distributed between 50 and 100. Each of these resources is associated with one of
three levels of security (secS ∈ {1.0, 1.2, 5.0}), according to a uniform distribution. The rationale for the
choice of these specific values is to achieve a good balance between the diversity of security levels and their
monetary cost. For this purpose we performed an analysis of the pricing schemes of Amazon EC2 and
Microsoft Azure, considering both “vanilla” and secure VM instances. It was possible to observe a wide
range of values depending on the security services included. For example, while an EC2 instance that has
container protection is around 20% more expensive than a normal instance (hence our choice of 1.2 for the
intermediate level of security), the cost of instances that offer threat prevention or encryption is at least 5
times greater (our choice for the highest level of security). The substrate nodes are also uniformly distributed
among three clouds, each one with a different security level (cloudS ∈ {1.0, 1.2, 5.0}) – justified along the
same line of reasoning. The goal is to represent a setup that includes a public cloud (lowest level), a trusted
public cloud, and a private datacenter (assumed to offer the highest security).
VNRs have a number of virtual nodes uniformly distributed between 2 and 45. Pairs of virtual nodes are
connected with a Waxman topology with probability 50%. The CPU and bandwidth of the virtual nodes and
links are uniformly distributed between 10 and 20. Several alternative security and availability requirements
are evaluated, as shown in Table 5. We assume that VNR arrivals are modeled as a Poisson process with
an average rate of 4 VNRs per 100-time units. Each VNR has an exponentially distributed lifetime with an
average of 1000-time units.
The MILP is solved using the open source library GLPK [16]. In the objective function, we set β1 =
β2 = β3 = 1 to balance evenly the cost components (Eq. 1). Parameter α was also set to 1 because our
pricing analysis showed negligible cost differences between intra- and inter-cloud links, in most of the relevant
scenarios. We set up 20 experiments, each with a different substrate topology (10 random and 10 Waxman).
Every experiment ran for 50 000 time units, during which embedding is attempted for groups of VNRs
(specifically, 10 sets of 2 000 VNRs each were tested). The order of arrival and the capacity requirements
5Please note that a node corresponds to a virtual switch, that can support hundreds to thousands of containers in a large
VM (recall Figure 1). In fact, the setup of experiments with our prototype [5] included running over 6 thousand containers per
VM.
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of each VNR are kept the same in each of the configurations of Table 5, ensuring that they solve equivalent
problems.
In the evaluation, we compared our approach with the D-ViNE MILP solution [9]. D-ViNE was chosen
because it has been considered as the baseline for most VNE work [8], and due to the availability of its
implementation as open-source software. While D-ViNE requirements are only based on CPU and band-
width capacities, our algorithm adds to these requirements security demands, namely node and link security
(including availability), and cloud preferences.
6.2. Metrics
We considered the following performance metrics in the evaluation:
– VNR acceptance ratio: the percentage of accepted requests (i.e., the ratio of the number of accepted VNRs
to the total number of VNRs);
– Node stress ratio: average load on the substrate nodes (i.e., average CPU consumption over all nodes);
– Link stress ratio: average load on the substrate links (i.e., average bandwidth consumption over all edges);
– Average revenue by accepting VNRs: One of the main goals of VNE is to maximize the profit of the
virtualization provider. For this purpose, and similar to [9, 17], the revenue generated by accepting a VNR
is proportional to the value of the acquired resources. As such, in our case, we take into consideration that
stronger security defenses will be charged at a higher (monetary) value. Therefore, the revenue associated
with a VNR is:
R(VNR) = λ1
∑
i∈NV
[1 + ϕ1(i)] cpu
V (i) secV (i) cloudV (i) +
λ2
∑
(i,j)∈EV
[1 + ϕ2(i, j)] bw
V (i, j) secV (i, j),
where λ1 and λ2 are scaling coefficients that denote the relative proportion of each revenue component to the
total revenue. These parameters offer providers the flexibility to price different resources differently. Variables
ϕ account for the need to have backups, either in the nodes (ϕ1(i)) or in the edges (ϕ2(i, j)). Specifically, if
ϕ1(i) = 1 node i requires backup, with 0 otherwise; if ϕ1(i, j) = 1, at least one node i or j requires backup,
with 0 otherwise.
This metric accounts for the average revenue obtained by embedding a VNR (i.e., the total revenue
generated by accepting the VNRs divided by the number of accepted VNRs).
– Average cost of accepting a VNR: The cost of embedding a VNR is proportional to the total sum of
substrate resources allocated to that VN. In particular, this cost has to take into consideration that certain
virtual edges may end up being embedded in more than one physical link (as in the substrate edge between
nodes b, d and c, in Figure 2). The cost may also increase if the VNR requires higher security for its virtual
nodes and links. Thus, we define the cost of embedding a VNR as:
C(VNR) = λ1
∑
i∈NV
∑
p∈NS
cpuip sec
S(p) cloudS(p) +
λ2
∑
(i,j)∈EV
∑
(p,q)∈ES
f i,jp,q sec
S(p, q),
where cpuip corresponds to the total amount of CPU allocated on the substrate node p for virtual node i
(either working or backup). Similarly, f i,jp,q denotes the total amount of bandwidth allocated on the substrate
link (p, q) for virtual link (i, j). λ1 and λ2 are the same weights introduced in the revenue formula to denote
the relative proportion of each cost component to the total cost. In the experiments, we set λ1 = λ2 = 1.
18
(a) (b) (c)
(d) (e) (f)
Figure 4: Average results and standard deviation (except first graph): (a) VNR acceptance ratio over time; (b) VNR
acceptance ratio; (c) Node utilization; (d) Link utilization; (e) Cost for accepting VNRs; (f) Revenue for accepting
VNRs.
6.3. Evaluation Results
Figure 4a displays the acceptance ratio over time for one particular experiment with a random topology
substrate. We can observe that after the first few thousand time units, the acceptance ratio tends to stabilize.
A similar trend also occurs with the other experiments, and for this reason, the rest of the results are taken
at the end of each simulation. Due to space constraints, the results in the following graphs are from the
Waxman topologies only (Figure 4b - 4f). We note however that the conclusions to be drawn are exactly the
same as for the random topologies. The main conclusions are:
SecVNE exhibits a higher average acceptance ratio when compared to D-ViNE, not only for
the baseline case but also when including security requirements: Figure 4b indicates that SecVNE
can make better use of the available substrate resources to embed the arriving VNRs when compared to
the most commonly employed VNE algorithm. It is interesting to note that SecVNE is better than D-Vine
even when 20% of the VNRs include security requirements, which are harder to fulfill. This does not mean
D-Vine is a poor solution – it merely shows that its model is not the best fit for our particular problem. In
particular, D-Vine uses the geographical distance of substrate nodes as one of the variables to consider in node
assignment. This parameter is less relevant in our virtualized environment but constrains D-Vine options.
In any case, notice that the results for D-Vine represent its best configuration with respect to geographical
location – we have tested D-Vine with the entire range of options for this parameter.
A richer set of demands decreases the acceptance ratio, but only slightly: VNRs with stronger
requirements have a greater number of constraints that need to be satisfied, and therefore it becomes more
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difficult to find the necessary substrate resources to embed them. However, a surprising result is the small
penalty in terms of acceptance ratio in the presence of security demands (see Figure 4b again). For instance,
an increase of 20 percentage points (pp) in the resources with security needs results in a penalty of only
around 1 pp in the acceptance ratio. Also interesting is the fact that the reduction in acceptance ratio is
more pronounced when VNRs have availability requirements when compared to security. In this case, an
increase of 20 pp in the number of nodes with replication results in a penalty of around 10 pp. This is because
of the higher use of substrate resources due to the reservation of backup nodes/links.
Security demands only cause a small decrease on substrate resources utilization. Figures 4c
and 4d show the substrate node and link stress ratio, respectively. We observe that the utilization of node
resources is very high in all cases (over 80%), meaning the mapping to be effective. It is also possible to see
that slightly more resources are allocated in the substrate network with SecVNE than with D-ViNE, which
justifies the higher acceptance ratio achieved. If the existing resources are used more extensively to be able
to serve more virtual network requests, then the assignment of virtual requests is being more effective. As
the link stress ratio is lower (again, for all cases), this means the bottleneck is the node CPU. Finally, the
link stress ratio of D-Vine is lower than in our solution. This is due to D-vine incorporating load balancing
into the formulation.
Security and availability requirements increase costs and revenues. Figures 4e and 4f display the
average cost and revenue for each VNR embedding, respectively. The results show that reasonable increases
in the security requirements (10% and 20%) only cause a slight impact on the costs. However, higher costs
are incurred to fulfill availability needs due to the extra reservation of resources (nodes and links). Since
D-vine does not consider security and availability aspects, it ends up choosing embeddings that are more
expensive (e.g., with respect to “NS+NA”). In terms of revenue, it can be observed that by charging higher
prices for security services, virtualization providers can significantly enhance their income — average revenue
almost doubles for a 20% increase in security needs.
7. Related Work
Virtual Network Embedding. There is already a wide literature on the VNE problem [8]. Yu et al. [17]
where the first to solve it efficiently, by assuming the capability of path splitting (multi-path) in the substrate
network, which enables the computationally harder part of the problem to be solved as a multicommodity
flow (MCF), for which efficient algorithms exist. The authors solve the problem considering two independent
phases – an approach commonly used by most algorithms. In the first phase, a greedy algorithm is used
for virtual node embedding. Then, to map the virtual links, either efficient MCF solutions or k-shortest
path algorithms can be used. In [9], Chowdhury et al. proposed two algorithms for VNE that introduce
coordination between the node and link mapping phases. The main technique proposed in this work is to
augment the substrate graph with meta-nodes and meta-links that allow the two phases to be well correlated,
achieving more efficient solutions. Neither of these initial works considered security.
Availability in VNE. As failures in networks are inevitable, the issue of failure recovery and survivability
in VNE has gained attention recently. H. Yu et al. [18] have focused on the failure recovery of nodes. They
proposed to extend the basic VNE mapping with the inclusion of redundant nodes. Rahman et al. [19]
formulated the survivable virtual network embedding (SVNE) problem to incorporate single substrate link
failures. Shahriar et al. [20] went further to consider the presence of multiple substrate link failures. Contrary
to our work, these proposals target only availability.
Multi-infrastructure VNE. The majority of the works in VNE field only consider a single infrastructure
provider. The exception is the work by Chowdhury et al. [21]. The problem which the authors address is,
however, different from ours. They proposed PolyVINE, a policy-based end-to-end VNE framework, that
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considers the conflicts of interest between service providers, interested in satisfying their demands while
minimizing their expenditure, and infrastructure providers, that strive to optimize resource allocation by
accepting requests that increase their revenues while offloading less profitable work onto their competitors.
This work is thus orthogonal to the one we present here.
Security in VNE. Another relatively less well-explored perspective on the VNE problem is providing
security guarantees. Fischer et al. [22] have introduced this problem, considering the inclusion of constraints in
the VNE formulation that take security into consideration. The authors proposed the assignment of security
levels to every physical resource, allowing virtual network requests to include security demands. From this
paper, we have borrowed the concept of security level as an abstraction to represent the different protection
mechanisms from the substrate and the users’ security demands. This position paper has only enunciated
the problem at a high level and has not proposed any solution or algorithm. Bays et al. [23] and Liu et
al. [24, 25] have afterwards proposed VNE algorithms based on this idea. None of these solutions support the
detailed specification of security we propose. The authors of [23] consider only link protection, by considering
specific physical paths to provide a cryptographic channel, assuring confidentiality in communications. Liu
et al. go further, by considering also node security. However, they also do not consider availability nor a
multi-cloud setting with different trust domains. In addition, their model makes a few assumptions that make
it unfeasible for a practical network virtualization platform. First, it requires virtual nodes to fulfill a specific
security level, demanded by the physical host. In practice, a virtualization platform cannot assume such
level of trust about its guests. Second, it assumes that the duration of a virtual network request is known
beforehand. This limits its applicability in a traditional pay-as-you-go model, as a cloud tenant typically
does not know in advance the duration of its requests. We make none of these assumptions in our work.
Finally, none of these works proposes a policy language to improve the expressiveness of substrate and virtual
network specification.
8. Conclusions
In this paper, we presented a new solution for the secure virtual network embedding (SecVNE) problem.
Our approach fits a multi-cloud network virtualization deployment and enhances over the state-of-the-art
on security. Specifically, by allowing users to define different security and availability demands to the nodes
and links of their virtual networks. The solution further allows tenants to leverage a substrate composed of
several clouds with distinct levels of trust, enabling specific node placement requirements to be set. By not
relying on a single cloud provider we avoid internet-scale single points of failures (with the support of backups
in different clouds). Besides, privacy and other security concerns can be accommodated by constraining the
mapping of certain virtual nodes to specific classes of clouds (e.g., sensitive workloads can be placed in a
private cloud).
We formulate the SecVNE model and solve it optimally as a Mixed Integer Linear Program (MILP).
In addition, we propose a new policy language to specify the characteristics of the substrate and virtual
networks, improving the expressiveness of user requests. Our extensive evaluation shows the efficiency of the
solution and the favorable cost-revenue trade-offs of including security services in virtual networks.
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